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COMMENT
SOCIAL INTEREST IN RATE REGULATION
IN WEST VIRGINIA
KAL P. WARDEN*
T HE purpose of this paper is to attempt to throw some small light
upon the hitherto relatively unexplored and uncharted field
concerning the desire of the State of West Virginia, through its
Supreme Court of Appeals and its Public Service Commission, to
act as a guardian of the social interests of the state and its people.
This discussion will be limited in its scope to the determination
of whether these two bodies have ever considered such social inter-
ests when determining the reasonableness of the rates to be charged
to patrons by the public utilities in this state.
It would be well to say at the beginning that neither our Su-
preme Court of Appeals nor our Public Service Commission has
ever said that they were attempting to apply Dean Roscoe Pound's
theories of social interests, nor have they attempted to classify the
interests as presented to them. So the conclusions reached by this
writer will be his own interpretation of what our Supreme Court of
Appeals and our Public Service Commission have done intersticially
and very much between the lines of their printed decisions. My
chief reliance will, of necessity, have to be on the records available
to me and let it be said now that I lay no claims to being a mind
reader or a "Bridey Murphy".1 My approach in this paper will be
to see (1) what the commission and the court said they were doing,
(2) to see what reasons they set forth for doing these things, (3) to
see what they actually did do, and (4) to make an educated guess
* LL.B., West Virginia University. Member of Fayette County bar.
1 "The factors likely to influence judicial decisions are:
A. Remote and indirect-
1. Education-
(a) General.
(b) Legal.
2. Family and personal associations; wealth and social position.
B. Direct-
1. Legal and political experience.
2. Political affiliations and opinions.
3. Intellectual and temperamental traits." Haines, General Obser-
vations on the Effects of Personal, Political.and Economic Influences in the
Decisions of judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 96 (1922).
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as to what lay in their minds at the time these things were actually
done. The chief inspiration for this paper came from the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the famous Hope case,2 where
he says:
"To what sources then are the Commission and the courts
to go for ascertaining the standards relevant to the regulation
of natural gas rates?... There appear to be two alternatives.
Either the fixing of natural gas rates must be left to the un-
guided discretion of the Commission so long as the rates it
fixes do not reveal a glaringly bad prophecy of the ability
of a regulated utility to continue its service in the future. Or
the Commission's rate orders must be founded on due consid-
eration of all the elements of the public interest which the
production and distribution of natural gas involve just because
* it is natural gas .... Of course the statute [Natural Gas Act]
is not concerned with abstract theories of rate making. But
its very ,foundation is the 'public interest,' and the public in-
terest is a texture of multiple strands. It includes more than
contemporary investors and contemporary consumers. The
needs to be served are not restricted to immediacy, and social
as well as economic costs must be counted ...
"The objection to the Commission's action is not that the
rates it granted were too low but that the range of its vision
was too narrow. And since the issues before the Commission
involved no less than the total public interest, the proceedings
before it should not be judged by narrow conceptions of com-
mon law pleading. And so I conclude that the case should
be returned to the Commission. In order to enable this Court
to discharge its duty of reviewing the Commission's order, the
Commission should set forth with explicitness the criteria by
which it is guided in determining that rates are 'just and rea-
sonable', and it should determine the public interest that is in
its keeping in the perspective of the considerations set forth
by Mr. Justice Jackson."3
There is the real essence of what we will be hunting in the
following West Virginia determinations, whether it exists or not
remains to be seen.
It now becomes necessary to set forth just what is meant when
referring to "social interests" in this paper. The definition of interests
and the theory of interests used will be that of Dean Roscoe Pound,
and it is, in general, as follows:
"An interest is a demand or desire which human beings
either individually or in groups seek to satisfy, of which, there-
2 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1943).
3 Id. at 626-28.
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fore, the ordering of human relations in civilized society must
take account.
"The law does not create interests. It classifies them and
recognizes a larger or smaller number; it defines the extent
to which it will give effect to those which it recognizes, in view
of (a) other interests, (b) the possibilities of effectively se-
curing them through law; it devises means for securing them
when recognized and within the determined limits.
"Hence in determining the scope and subject matter of
a legal system we have (1) to take an inventory of the inter-
ests which press for recognition and generalize and classify
them;4 (2) to determine the interests which the law should
recognize and seek to secure; (3) to determine the principles
upon which such interests should be defined and limited for
the purpose of securing them; (4) to consider the means by
which the law may secure them when recognized and delim-
ited; and (5) to take account of the limitations upon effective
4 Pound's outline of interests to be secured:
1. Individual.
(a) Personality.
(1) The physical person.
(2) Freedom of will-
free choice of location
free determination.
(3) Honor-reputation.
(4) Privacy and sensibilities.
(5) Belief and opinion.
(b) Domestic relations.(c) Substance.
(1) Property.(2) Freedom of industry and contract.
(3) Promised advantages.
(4) Advantageous relations with other.,.
2. Public.
(a) Interests of the state as a juristic person.
(1) Personality.
(2) Substance.
(b) Interests of the state as guardian of social interests.
3. Social.
Jhering's classification:
(a) The physical conditions of life of the society-i.e., the external
security of its existence.
(b) The economic conditions of life of the society-i.e., the security
of trade and commerce.(c) The ideal conditions of life of the society-those involved in its
moral and religious foundations.
(1) General security.(2) Security of social institutions.
(3) General morals.(4) Conservation of social resources.
(5) General progress.(6) The individual life.
PoUNr, OUTLIE OF JUISPRUDENCE 97-112 (5th ed. 1943).
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legal action which may preclude complete recognition or com-
plete securing of interests which otherwise we should seek
to secure."5
"The interests which the legal order secures may be (1)
demands or desires involved in or regarded from the stand-
point of the individual life immediately as such (individual
interests); (2) demands or desires involved in or looked at from
the standpoint of life in a politically organized society, asserted
in title of political life (public interests); or (3) those wider
demands or desires involved in or looked at from the stand-
point of social life in civilized society and asserted in title of
social life (social interests)."6
The first West Virginia case of any major importance in the
rate making field is one which has been largely ignored since the
advent of the Public Service Commission in 1913. The oft cited,
but rarely considered, case, Coal & Coke Ry. v. Conley and Avis,7
is, like the first robin, a definite harbinger of the spring of socio-
logical jurisprudence in West Virginia. The case is doubly in-
teresting in that it came at a time in the history of this country when
the courts were slowly swinging from a period in the law when
the accent was on strict interpretation of the laws and when the
emphasis was on the protection of property and rugged individ-
ualism to the present period of the law where the emphasis is more
on the sociological import of the decisions and the legislative and
administrative made laws.
The Coal & Coke case contains much that cannot be considered
due to the rather limited scope of this paper, however it would be
well to see some of the more salient features of the decision that
do bear, at least in part, on the point of reasonableness of rates in
order that we might catch the frame of mind of the court when
rendering the decision. The case concerns a bill in equity by the
railroad company against the Attorney General of West Virginia
and the Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County, to enjoin them
from enforcing the two cent passenger rate law passed by our
legislature.8 The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff and
granted the injunction; the defendants appealed and it was affrmed
in part, reversed in part, and modified. "... [T] he act involved
5 ld. at 96.
6 Ibid.
767 W. Va. 129, 67 S.E. 613 (1910).
8 W. Va. Acts 1907, c. 41.
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limits the charges of railroad companies, fifty miles long and over,
for the transportation of passengers, to two cents per mile, and
imposes a fine... for each violation of any provision thereof.",
The first real problem in the case was whether or not the State
of West Virginia had such an interest involved in the suit that it,
although not named as a defendant, would actually be a party in
interest and thus cause the case to be within the constitutional
inhibition which prevents the State of West Virginia from being
made a party defendant in any court of law or equity. 10 "The cri-
terion, then, is the nature and extent of the State's interest, if any,
in the subject matter. .. ." 1 The court goes on to say, "Its [the
statute's] primary object is not revenue in the form of penalties.
On the contrary, it is limitation of transportation charges in favor
of the traveling public, and not of the State. . . . these penalties
like most others, are really for the benefit of the people and not the
State, although, if incurred and enforced, they would come into the
State treasury. The receipt thereof would be nevertheless merely
incidental to the enforcement of a measure dictated by public policy,
just as in the case of penalties arising from violation of other laws,
enacted under the police power of the State. . . . it is manifest
that the interest12 of the State in the controversy is indirect and
remote . '. ."13 The court goes into a long discussion of the necessity
of such a circuitous remedy being employed due to the failure of
the legislature to provide any direct method of testing the reason-
ableness and validity of the limitation on rates prescribed by the
act. Thus we have a situation arising in which the legislature had
determined that two cents per passenger mile was a reasonable
rate to be charged by railroads in this state. The case was deter-
mined in 1910, several years before the Public Service Commis-
sion was created by the legislature, but it involves the same type
of thing that we find today when the Public Service Commission,
acting as an arm of the legislature, sets a rate as being reasonable
and then such rate is appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals
as being confiscatory and unreasonable. Since this is the first case
in West Virginia directly involving the problem of reasonableness
9 67 W. Va. at 138, 67 S.E. at 617.10 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
"167 W. Va. at 139, 67 S.E. at 617.
12 Notice that here the court is really using the word "interest" in a differ-
ent sense than that in which it is employed in this paper. Here the court is
thinking about the question of whether the state is in the real sense the party
defendant, thus whether they are a party in "interest".
13 67 W. Va. at 139, 67 S.E. at 618.
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of rates it will be important to see whether the court balanced any'
interests other than those of the railroad and the patrons when
determining this question. The court rather clearly distinguished
between the "interest" of the state as a party defendant and the
"interest" of the state in general welfare of its citizens when it said:
"The state, considered in the broad sense of the term, can have no
interest in a controversy of this class. The state and the government
of the state are two different things, the former being an ideal
person, intangible, invisible, immutable; the latter a mere agent,
and, within the spirit of the agency, a perfect representative; but
outside of that, a lawless usurper ... It is to the interest of the
state.. . to restrain the conduct of every citizen in the interest of
the general welfare."1 4 And finally the court gets down to the real
meat of the problem so far as this discussion is concerned. "What
constitutes a fair and reasonable return for the use of invested
capital has never been definitely settled by the adoption of any
particular standard for all purposes and to govern under all con-
ditions."' 5 The court recites the currently discredited Smythe v.
Ames'6 rule of actual investment as a rate base. It is the tenor of
this discussion and not the rule laid down as to rate base that we
are interested in here. "Under exceptional and peculiar circum-
stances, what would be ordinarily a reasonable rate of profit on
the entire investment is disallowed, as being more than the service
is worth to the public and therefore unjust to it .... Both the public
and the public service investor are to be considered, and justice
done to each."'7 The few lines wherein the court, for the first time,
gives us an actual glimpse of the new weight to be placed on the
judicial scales and also shows us into which pan it will be placed
are as follows: "In our opinion, the railroad company has the
right to earn reasonable compensation for the use of its property
now, if it can do so without imposing unreasonable rates on the
public, rates disproportionate to the value of the service rendered.
[The judicial scale is brought into focus and the pan of the public
utility and the pan of the patron are placed in even balance to begin
the weighing.] In this connection we deem it just to say that the
service of this railroad may be worth more to the traveling public
and especially to the people living along its line, under the cir-
14 Id. at 142-43, 67 S.E. at 619.
15 Id. at 189, 67 S.E. at 689.
16 169 U.S. 466 (1897).
17 67 W. Va. at 190, 67 S.E. at 689-40.
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cumstances, than the service of some other railroad, differently
situated. [So we see that only one public utility is in the railroad
pan, and not all the railroads affected by this rate legislation.] The
building thereof enabled them to travel to, from and through, the
section of the country, traversed by it, much more cheaply than
they could otherwise have done. [And now comes the bright and
shining new weight to be deposited in one or the other of the pans.
This weight is the "interests of the state as guardian of social in-
terests". ] The railroad has displaced the horse, carriage and wagon
and greatly reduced the expense of travel and transportation, as
well as contributed to the convenience of the people and added
value to all the property of that part of the state. This, it seems
to us, is a circumstance that ought to weigh heavily on the ques-
tion, whether a particular rate is just to the public as well as fair
to the carrier."-" Now in a few short sentences the weight is de-
posited in one of the pans. "... [T] he complainant having earned
practically nothing on its passenger traffic, above cost of trans-
portation, and less than two and one-half per cent of its invest-
ment on its entire traffic, and it further appearing that larger earn-
ings from passenger traffic would have been realized, but for the
operation of this statute, we are clearly of the opinion that it is
confiscatory in its effect upon this railroad."19 The weight is
deposited in the railroad's pan, the scales swing, and the balance
is struck. ". . . [T]he act of 1907, limiting passenger fares on
complainant's railroad to two cents a mile, is unconstitutional in
its operation and effect upon said company, because it reduces,
or compulsorily contributes to the reduction of, the net earnings
below the point of reasonable remuneration .... "20
The court concludes by saying, in effect, that if the interest
of society moves from the pan of the railroad into that of the patron
then there can be a reapplication to the court for a new balancing
of interests and a possible dropping of the injunction. There is
an interesting statement in the dissenting opinion of Judge Williams.
He says, desiring to make the injunction absolute, "furthermore,
this state is in the process of development. It is necessary for the
building of many more miles of railroad before all the natural
wealth of the state can be made available, and the policy of the
state heretofore has been to encourage railroad building; and cer-
18 Id. at 200-201, 67 S.E. at 644.
19 Id. at 201, 67 S.E. at 644.
20 Ibid.
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tainly the legislature could not have had this policy in mind at the
time of the passage of this act, because, instead of encouraging
development, it operates to discourage and retard it. No railroad
corporation owning a line less than fifty miles in length would want
to extend its line beyond fifty miles, if its earning capacity is to
be reduced by such an extension, thereby subjecting itself to the
two-cent rate regulation."21 It would seem that Judge Williams
preferred that the weight of "social interests" be slightly adhesive,
so that once deposited it remains, like the pyramids, immovable.22
This opinion was written and given in March, 1910, slightly over
eleven years before Dean Pound wrote his Theory of Social Inter-
ests2 3 and it is not the intent of this writer to suggest that the crys-
tallized image of "social interests" as developed by Dean Pound
was, or could have been, in the minds of the judges who wrote the
opinion at this time. But I do suggest that the same motivations,
the same social and economic forces, and the same general phi-
losophy of the times moved both the pens of our learned judges
and the pen of Dean Pound. The claims, wants and demands
of the group of human beings which composed the newly de-
veloping State of West Virginia, and the desire to satisfy that
need for development and industrial and economic expansion
motivated the social engineering of our court in giving the railroads
a right to a higher return on their investment, and thus our court
took into account both the interests of the railroad, the patrons
and the whole social group as such.24 In this case the interests and
claims of the whole social group as such could best be furthered
by holding these legislative made rates to be unreasonable. In
other later cases the interests of society, as we shall see, lay with
211d. at 212, 67 S.E. at 648.
22Such an attitude is more indicative of the period of the maturity of the
law which was currently making its last bow, than of the present period in which
social interests do not always lay on the side of the rugged individual. How-
ever, the influence of a desire to benefit society as well as the exploiter of nature
is readily apparent. Dean Pound said, ". .. there is the social interest in
general progress; the claim or want or demand of society that the development
of human powers and of human control over nature for the satisfaction of human
wants go forward; the demand that social engineering be increasingly and
continually improved... " Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, in 15 P. ERs
Am PRocEEDINcs oF = AmucAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETr 16, 89 (1921).
23 Ibid.
24 "... [L] egal institutions and doctrines almost always have behind them,
not one social interest or a simple compromise of two, but a complex har-
monizing of many. It is of the first importance to perceive this, to note what
these interests are, how they are harmonized or compromised, and why it is
done in this way rather than in another." Id. at 83.
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the patrons and a slowing down of the free rein of industrial growth
and expansion. This newly constructed railroad ran through a sec-
tion of West Virginia which was rich with virgin timber and un-
developed seams of coal. It was to the interest of the people in
this state that this coal and timber be carried to the markets of the
world. This could not be done unless this railroad became a sound
financial proposition, thus the return on the investment had to be
attractive to investors and the only way to accomplish this was to
permit the rates to exceed the arbitrary two cents per mile estab-
lished by the legislature. This was done.
In 1913 the West Virginia Public Service Commission was
created by our legislature,2 5 in order to relieve the courts and the
legislature of the ever increasing burden of regulation of public
utilities. Subsequent to the creation of the commission there was a
small flood of attempts by railroads in the state to have the two
cents per passenger mile statutory burden removed from their roads.
The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad attempted to follow the example
set in the Coal & Coke case, but the supreme court told them in
no uncertain terms that the remedy for their problems now lay in
an appeal first to the Public Service Commission to determine
whether the rate was reasonable, and that the methods used in
the Coal & Coke case were no longer available to them.20  The
Public Service Commission then took upon themselves the job of
regulating railroad rates and interpreting the legislative made
rates.2
7
The first few years of life for the Public Service Commission
showed very little in the way of a desire to weigh and balance
patron, utility and social interests. The decisions were generally
short and the interpretative language of the commission cannot
honestly be said to be indicative of what interests were being pro-
tected in their rate decisions. 28  An interesting case before our
25 W. Va. Acts 1913, c. 9.
26 State ex rel. Public Service Comm'n v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 76 W. Va.
399, 85 S.E. 714 (1915).2 7 Western Maryland Ry., W. Va. P.S.C. Biennial Rep. 128 (1916), where
the commission allowed a rate increase to two and one half cents per passenger
mile but gave no reasons for their decision.
28See City of Benwood v. Public Service Comm'n, 1 IV. Va. P.S.C. Rep.
161 (1914), where the commission cites the Supreme Court of Washington
which speaks of the interest of the public utility as an "interest born of neces-
sity." However, the most general problem at this time was not what the Public
Service Commission actually did, but rather whether they could constitutionally
do anything.
9
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supreme court along about this time, although not specifically in
point so far as reasonableness of rates is concerned, was the Ran-
dall Gas Co. v. Star Glass Co.29 This was a case in which the
Public Service Commission had raised the rates of the gas com-
pany but the gas company had failed to have these rates properly
filed with the commission prior to collecting them from their pa-
trons. The patron sued for reparation. The case becomes interesting
in so far as this discussion is concerned because of one statement
made in it and not answered by the court. "Denial of the application
of the principles declared in... [citations] is supplemented by the
assertion that the legislature has no power to regulate rates against
the interests of the people and in favor of a corporation." (Emphasis
supplied.) 30 This would have been the ideal spot for Judge Poffen-
barger, who wrote the majority opinion in the Coal & Coke case
to have explained the theory behind the regulation of rates in this
state and also to explain some of the prior holdings of the court
on the subject of rate regulation. However, he did not elaborate
on this question at all. A possible explanation may have been the
sparseness of the facts in the record presented to the court.
The Public Service Commission was beginning to come into its
own about 1917 and the opinions in the formal cases during the
next few years really give some insight into the minds of the com-
missioners as to what they were thinking about when they were
faced with a rate problem. "It is the duty of the Commission not
only to look after the interests of the public and see that this addi-
tional burden is not placed upon the citizens, unless authorized to
do so by the evidence, but to do justice by the company as well.
The investor must be protected in his investment, or capital will
seek other localities where investments will be safe. The indus-
trial development and progress of the state depends very largely
upon the assurance that the investor in public utilities will be pro-
tected in his legitimate investment, and allowed to receive a rea-
sonable return thereon. The public should, at all times, be ready
and willing to contribute a reasonable compensation for the serv-
ice received by it. Having this policy in view, the accountants
employed by the Commission were instructed to make a thorough
and impartial investigation of the matters arising on the petition
2978 W. Va. 252, 88 S.E. 840 (1916).
30 RandaUl Gas Co. v. Star Glass Co., 78 W. Va. 252, 254, 88 S.E. 840, 841
(1916).
10
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in this case in order that a fair result might be obtained."31 Such
language could only have flowed from a mind that was concerned
with the advancement of the social interests of the state in its peo-
ple. "The needs to be served are not restricted to immediacy, and
social as well as economic costs must be counted."32 The two state-
ments are almost identical in thought, only the words used are
different. But this is not an isolated instance, there is a very defi-
nite body of principles built up by the commission which are easily
seen when reading their formal opinions during this period. Natural
gas rates should, "as a matter of public policy and as a proper meas-
ure of fairness to those engaged in the natural gas business, be fixed
so as not only to secure a liberal return for the capital and enter-
prise invested therein, but as well to encourage and promote the
further development and extension of the business." 33 Why promote
and encourage the extension and development of the business? "Vast
industrial enterprises are now almost wholly dependent upon the
use of gas as a fuel for their continued prosperity, if not actual
existence. The use of natural gas as a domestic fuel adds greatly
to the comfort and convenience of those so fortunate as to have
it available at a reasonable price for their purpose."34 But there is
still more of this language. "The utility must be ready upon a
moment's notice to supply thousands of gallons of water per min-
ute in order to give adequate fire protection. It should therefore,
receive a fair return upon the extra investment in plant capacity
needed to meet such an emergency, and be compensated for the
additional operating costs incident thereto. Adequate fire protec-
tion is a general benefit to the whole community; it reduces insur-
ance rates and property loss . . ."35 There the commission deter-
mines that the property owners should pay for this rate increase
through higher taxes to the city and that the city should have to
pay more for its water. Nor were the courts completely silent in
this field at this time. In City of Bluefield v. Water Works3 the
Public Service Commission had entered an order allowing the water
company to increase its rates according to a schedule of rates fixed
by the commission and set out in the order. The case was retained
"I Re Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., P.U.R. 1917D 152, 168 (1917).
32 Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627
(1943).
33 Re United Fuel Gas Co., P.U.R. 1918C 198, 236 (1918).
34 Ibid.
35 Re Hinton Water, Light & Supply Co., P.U.R. 1919D 467, 480 (1919).
3681 W. Va. 202, 94 S.E. 121 (1917).
11
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on the commission's docket so that they could take whatever other
action might prove necessary. The water company complained that
the rates were confiscatory. The court says, "it is evident that the
rates prescribed, though based on that valuation, (an estimate by
the commission's chief statistician) were intended to be, and by
the order were made experimental only and not final, and it would
be impossible for us now to determine what earnings the rates pre-
scribed will actually produce.... in advance of the ascertained
result of the experiment, we could not say they are confiscatory
and void."37 "The valuation of the property of a public service
corporation for rate making purposes and the fixing of rates for
tolls and charges for the services to be rendered are purely legis-
lative acts and are not the subject of judicial inquiry, except in so
far and in so far only as may be necessary to determine whether
such rates are void on constitutional or other grounds." (Emphasis
added. )38 Is not the court in effect saying "we cannot see what
effect these proposed new rates will have on the patron, the utility
and the interests of the whole social group as such, and therefore
until such time as sufficient evidence is produced for us to use in
striking a balance we will leave the situation undisturbed"? 9 Of
course, this type of case is essentially local in its nature and the
broad general impact on society which is present in cases involving
large gas companies, railroads, etc., would not be present here. This
does not prevent the court from considering the interests of the
social group, but only gives to that social group a lesser weight
than it would have if a larger segment of society were an inter-
ested party. An interesting attempt by a group of patrons to
use social interests of a town's population in order to have a
temporary rate increase for the water company suspended is
found in the case of City of Charleston v. Public Service
Comm'~n.4 0 There, as one of the numerous arguments set forth
to have the rate suspended, the city suggested that the water that
37 Id. at 203, 94 S.E. at 122.
38 Id. at 204, 94 S.E. at 122.
9 ". .. [A~nd there is the interest of the state that one of the state's gov-
ernmental agencies, viz., the courts, shall not do work already done by another
of the state's governmental agencies, that other being an expert commission
specially designed and authorized by the state to do that work. And there is
the interest of the state that its courts shall not be unduly used for an unrea-
sonably prolonged series of trials of the same cause." Hardman, The Extent
of the Finality of Commissiores Rate Regulations, 28 W. VA. L.Q. 111, 122(1922).
4083 W. Va. 718, 99 S.E. 63 (1919).
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was being supplied to them by the utility was contaminated and
thereby caused great epidemics amongst its citizens. But the court
said that the Public Service Commission had taken that fact into
consideration and had noted that the condition could only be reme-
died by allowing the utility such return upon their investment that
they could afford to install better equipment. The court agreed with
the commission that this could be best accomplished by allowing
a rate increase. Thus the argument for the social interests was used
by the commission and the court to deny the very thing it was put
forth to accomplish. The social interests of the community could
best be served by allowing a rate increase to the utility.41 A West
Virginia case which seems most promising when first reading
through it, and which is most disappointing when it is finished is
Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Public Service Comm'n.42 Here
the court makes broad use of words which indicate a sincere interest
in balancing consumer, utility, and social interests when discussing
the rate making powers of the commission and also when discussing
the discrimination between the general public and the manufac-
turers using the gas produced. Yet when they come to the main
body of the discussion as to the reasonableness of the rates actually
charged there is no language present which gives any indication
that they had ever considered interests other than those of the
patron and the utility. The court goes into some detail concerning
the exhaustion of gas fields in the Clarksburg area, and yet they
give no indication whatever that the state and its general public
could have any interest in this depletion of our natural resources.
"It cannot be doubted that in fixing the rate to be charged by a
public utility such as the petitioner, there is an element to be con-
sidered which does not ordinarily enter into the matter of rate
making. Public utilities such as water companies, or light com-
panies are considered upon the theory of perpetual life, and when
41 Some evidencing of an interest in living and functioning utilities was
shown by our Public Service Commission when they said, "to meet the enormous
increase in operation costs it has been absolutely necessary, in order to prevent
bankruptcies and receiverships, to increase the rates of practically all the utili-
ties throughout the country engaged in the public service." Re West Virginia
Traction & Electric Co., P.U.R. 1919E 95, 106 (1919). See also Appalachian
Power Co., 6 W. Va. P.S.C. Rep. 170 (1919), where the commission determined
that future expansion costs could not be used to their full extent in computing
a rate base for the utility. The full rate increase was not allowed and the
interest in expansion seemed to be both in the interest of the consumer and
the utility. Thus, the social interest could best be served by giving it weight
on both sides of the judicial scales.
4284 W. Va. 638, 100 S.E. 551 (1919).
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the proper return is allowed upon the investment and a proper
amount for maintaining the physical properties in effective condi-
tion, the public utility has no ground for complaint, but where as
in this case the life of the utility is determined by the exhaustion
of its gas fields there must be in addition to the allowance for inter-
est on the investment, and for the expense of keeping the plant
in effective condition, another item sufficient to amortize the plant
within the probable life of the field from which the gas is obtained.
• . . Assuming that the petitioner's contention is correct, that its
plant will become obsolescent in five years, it would be manifestly
unjust to charge those who consume the gas during that last five
years with practically the entire cost of the plant, in addition to a
reasonable return upon the entire investment there."43 So we see
that the patron's interest in the exhaustion of the gas fields receives
a big boost in the language of the court and that of the utility is
accordingly let down. And the interest of the general public? 44 It
has been said that there is a "foreshadowing of the Hope rationale"
in the case of City of Huntington v. Public Service Comm'n.45 And
to support this proposition the following language from that case
is cited: "There is no immutable standard for the measurement
of the income a company serving the public is entitled to under
all circumstances and conditions, and in the very nature of things
there could not be. The facts of each case differ from the facts of
every other case. No two of them are any more alike than are two
or more faces."4 6 But the remainder of the opinion does not indi-
cate that our court was considering the facet of the Hope case which
inspired this paper. The concurring opinions of Judges Ritz and
Poffenbarger do go into some discussion of the growth of the city
of Huntington and its future expansion and needs. This expansion
is considered chiefly from the angle of the risk that the water com-
pany is running in expanding its facilities and the risk that is run
when making its original investment in the particular community.
Of course, such statements do indicate that more than mere dry
mathematical computation went into the decision as to the rea-
43Id. at 649, 100 S.E. at 555 (1919).
44 
"The regulation of rates is of growing concern to everyone since, directly
or indirectly, the entire population is affected by the cost of water, gas, elec-
tricity and public communication and transportation." Vise and Baer, Some
Comments on Rate Making in West Virginia, 57 W. VA. L. REv. 33 (1955).
45 49 W. Va. 703, 110 S.E. 192 (1921).
46 City of Huntington v. Public Service Comm'n, 89 W. Va. 703, 718, 110
S.E. 192, 198 (1921).
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sonableness of the rates to be charged by the utility. But, as a whole,
the opinion and the two concurring opinions shed but feeble light
on the question of whether our court balances interests other than
those of the patron and the utility when determining the reason-
ableness of rates for public utilities.47
Somewhere along the long line of rate cases both our Supreme
Court of Appeals and our Public Service Commission began to
forget about the woods and concentrated only on trees. The de-
cisions become hard and mechanical. The cases present a steady
flow of figures and percentages and expert opinions.48  There are
but few decisions of the Public Service Commission, since the
early days of the commission, which give any indication of interests,
other than that of the consumer and the utility, having any weight
at all in their determination .4  "Another factor cannot be ignored.
The Commission is not oblivious of the 10,000 West Virginians who
seek and under the law are entitled to telephone service from this
company but cannot get it, . . . nor to the thousands of others
who have applied for but cannot obtain from it an upgrading in
the service they now receive .... In fact, its (the company) stated
policy for some time has been not to meet this demand for service,
and it shows no disposition to attempt to do so in the future. Such
an attitude on the part of the respondent in disregard for its duty
to serve the public in the area in which it operates is a matter of
deep concern to this commission."50 There is similar language to
be found in several other of the cases concerning telephone serv-
ice, but it appears to be nothing but language.51 The same seems
47 A rather interesting twist in the usual pattern of rate inquiries is to
be found in Charleston-Dunbar Natural Gas Co., 9 W. Va. P.S.C. Rep. 63
(1921). There the patrons of the utility asked the Public Service Commission
to let the gas company increase its rates in order that the gas company might
obtain additional capital so that it could remain in business. The rate increase
was allowed. The patrons here were industries being served by the gas com-
pany and they were dependent on its services in order to remain productive
themselves. Could it be that the patrons are more concerned with the general
prosperity of the community than the community itself is?
4 8 
"It is submitted that as long as the current rate making philosophy of
the West Virginia commission is purely a mechanical process, geared solely
to a strict bookkeeping basis, an ominous threat exists to realistic regulation
which is necessary to sustain the growth of the utility business with fair and
equal treatment to both the investor and consumer." Wise and Baer, supra
note 44, at 51,
49 Re United Fuel Gas Co., 1 P.U.R.3d 373 (1953).
50 C. & P. Tel. Co., 38 W. Va. P.S.C. Rep. 80, 101 (1950).
51 C. & P. Tel. Co., 37 W. Va. P.S.C. Rep. 32 (1950); 39 id. at 67 (1952);
Beckley Water Co., 30 W. Va. P.S.0. Rep. 45 (1943); Pocahontas Telephone
Co., 10 W. Va. P.S.C. Rep. 187 (1923).
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to be true in our Supreme Court of Appeals, their language is ac-
counting book mechanical.52
Has West Virginia fallen into a morass of mathematics, or has
our Supreme Court of Appeals merely set the pattern to be fol-
lowed and our Public Service Commission done such an admirable
job that the court need not interfere? Following the decision in
the Hope case these comments appeared in a law review article:
"Just what is this balancing of the investor and consumer interests?
Is this some new theory of rate making and, if so, what are the
methods by which this balancing can be accomplished? The con-
sumer is 'interested' in having rates as low as possible and the
investor is 'interested' in having rates which will produce the highest
net income, but these are desires, not legal interests whicli- the
commissions and courts ordinarily recognize and protect. Most
of us have thought that consumers are entitled to rates no higher
than necessary to provide a reasonable return to the investor and
that the investor is entitled to the same thing. So what is the func-
tion of doing any balancing? '"53 The author then supplies, what he
considers to be, the answer to his own question: "It thus appears
that the process of balancing resolves itself into deciding how un-
just we may be to the investor, and we are furnished with no stand-
ard of injustice other than the subjective reactions of the 'expert
administrators charged with the duty of regulation.'5 4  Can this
really be the answer to the question of "Why balance interests"?
Certainly not.5 5 "Only one third of the present century has elapsed.
It is not until the second half of a century that what will prove to be
its characteristic modes of thought stand out definitely .... Mani-
festly one cannot speak with assurance as to how we are in the end
to value competing and overlapping interests in the present cen-
tury. But some part of the path of the juristic thought of tomorrow
is already apparent. It seems to be a path toward an ideal of co-op-
52 City of Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co., 115 W. Va. 149, 175 S.E. 339
(1934); City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm'n, 110 W. Va. 245, 159
S.E. 38 (1931); City of Huntington v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 W. Va.
378, 133 S.E. 144 (1926).
53 Brown, Ghosts of the Hope Natural Gas Decision, 32 CALY. L. Rav. 398,
405 (1944).
54 Id. at 406.
55 It would seem that the smog in California is so bad that Dean Pound's
message has not yet been able to penetrate.
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eration rather than one of competitive self-assertion... .I suspect
that the idea will prove to be co-operation toward civilization." 0
Our Supreme Court of Appeals and our Public Service Com-
mission got off to a good start in their determination of the rea-
sonableness of rates. They balanced the interests of the patron,
the investor, and the interests of society. This balancing was evi-
dent in their printed decisions. But somewhere this idea got lost
in the crowd of mathematics and experts. Occasionally there are
fleeting glimpses of it through the throng but generally these are
few and far between. As to whether it still plays an important role
this author cannot say. But there is no question in his mind that
it should be there and that it should be expressed in loud and clear
terms so that all may know of its presence. The general public has
a very vital interest in what happens to our natural resources and
this interest should not be pushed aside and forgotten by those
whose purpose it is to protect this interest. "The vicissitudes of
phenomena in time and space defy accurate control by human
understanding and foresight even though human understanding
56 Pound, How Far Are We Attaining a New Measure of Values in Twen-
tieth-Century Juristic Thought, 42 W. VA. L.Q. 81 (1936).
See also, Hardman, The Social Interest in the Aesthetic and the Sociali-
zation of the Law, 29 W. VA. L.Q. 195, 196-198 (1928): "The subject matter
that law deals with is interests, that is, human wants, claims, desires. These
interests are either individual interests, i.e., interests of individuals, or public
interests, i.e., interests of the state as a juristic person or as a guardian of social
interests, or social interests, i.e., interests of society. The owner of the property
has a want or interest in using his property for anti-aesthetic purposes-an in-
dividual interest. Society has a want or interest in having property in its midst
so used as not to prevent society or individual members thereof from living a
proper life-a social interest. The state as guardian of social interests has an
interest of the same sort as the last-in form a public interest but in substance
a social interest. Now, here as elsewhere in the law, it is not possible for the
law to secure or satisfy all wants or interests since some of them conflict. There-
fore the end of law today is to secure or satisfy as many of these wants or
interests as possible and sacrifice as few as possible and in so doing to secure
the more important interests and sacrifice the less important. If we apply this
method of reasoning, which of the above mentioned interests with respect to
the anti-aesthetic use of property should, upon a balancing of the conflicting
interests, be considered paramount and therefore be secured? ...
"We are beginning to realize that the central unit of civilization is not the
individual but society and therefore social interests are more important than
individual interests. Hence, where the two interests conflict, since both can
not be secured, the tendency is to sacrifice the individual interest so far as it
is necessary in order to secure, to a reasonable extent, the more important in-
terests of society. This salutory change in the law secures to the owner of
property his reasonable wants with respect to the use of his property-which is
all that the owner can reasonably ask-and secures to society its reasonable wants
with respect to aesthetic surroundings, thus socializing the law by reasonably
securing the social interest in aesthetic surroundings and harmonizing the law
with the preponderant settled opinion of civilized society."
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and foresight were constantly at their greatest. In fact they are
rarely at their greatest, and times and places with lesser intellectual
equipment must be content with lesser accuracy. But none of these
drawbacks justifies a refusal to search for what accuracy is attain-
able, with the best instruments that can be devised. Pound's cri-
terion of good law is at once a proclamation of faith in such a
search, and a courageous plan of the territory to be covered."57 The
tools are available here in West Virginia, let the workmen use them.
5 7 Stone, A Critique of Pound's Theory of Interests, 20 IowA L. REv. 531,
550 (1935).
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